A new EMNLP benchmark (CAVEWOMAN) put hard numbers behind a hunch: telling an LLM to be concise cuts API cost about 1.5x on average, up to 3x, with accuracy nearly flat. Compressing the input prompt does the opposite, since the model rambles to fill gaps, costing up to 96% more while answering worse. Across 9 models, 8 datasets, and 11 languages, the verdict is blunt: shrink the output, not the prompt.
Existing AI-exposure models measure where AI could work, not whether workers have adopted it. This paper introduces "delegated exposure," an Agentic Adoption Index built by matching 53,000 shared agent skills from Manus against 18,000 O*NET task statements. The result: real delegation concentrates in different occupations than pre-AI risk frameworks predicted, and adoption peaks in mid-wage bachelor-level work, declining among the most educated.
Safety alignment in LLMs is skin-deep: refusal triggers live at the final layers while pretrained harm knowledge stays buried. This paper shows how "semantic camouflage", harmful intent wrapped in benign creative-writing prompts, becomes mathematically indistinguishable from safe queries late in the network, yet retains a detectable early-layer harm signature. Latent Intent Verification, a lightweight probing defense, exploits that, beating standard guardrails by 20-50% across Phi-3, Qwen2.5, and Gemma-2b with no retraining.