Unit 42 uncovered Aeternum, a C++ loader that stores encrypted C2 commands in Polygon smart contracts and pulls them via public RPC endpoints. By moving the entire command channel on‑chain, the botnet sidesteps traditional domain‑based takedowns and forces defenders to monitor blockchain traffic. The finding forces security teams to add blockchain‑awareness to their detection playbooks.
Sandworm’s UAC‑0145 cluster pretends to recruit system admins, moving conversations to Telegram and Zoom before sending a tampered WireGuard client. The client decodes a hidden AES key, runs a PowerShell script that creates a scheduled task and pulls a second‑stage payload, turning a fake VPN test into a malware drop.
The article reveals that the espionage framework CAV3RN now uses a .NET NativeAOT DLL that can pick between direct HTTPS and a Google Apps Script relay based on DNS A‑record responses, allowing operators to rotate channels and hide traffic in legitimate Google services. This modular C2 design complicates detection and shows the group’s focus on Israeli targets.